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From Schmerber to McNeely to Birchfield:
The Life and Death of the “Per Se” Rule
Jana Nestlerode
I. Introduction
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court decided Schmerber v.
California, therein creating an “emergency exception” to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement.1 Specifically, police officers had
probable cause to believe that an arrestee was driving under the
influence of alcohol; they also had probable cause to believe that
evidence of that crime existed in his bloodstream.2 Two hours after
the automobile accident giving rise to the arrest, officers directed
medical personnel to take a sample of the arrestee’s blood.3 The
Court upheld this warrantless search as a “reasonable” search under
the circumstances. The length of time that had elapsed since the ac-
cident, coupled with the evanescent nature of the evidence, provided
ample justification for an exigency sufficient to obviate the need for a
search warrant.4
Forty-seven years later, the High Court again addressed the
“emergency exception” to the search warrant requirement in driving
under the influence cases.5 Here, however, the Court held that of-
ficers improperly seized evidence from the arrestee without a search
warrant. The defendant had been stopped for speeding and refused
a breathalyzer test.6 The officer then arrested the driver and
transported him to a medical facility for blood to be drawn over the
driver’s objection.7 Under the circumstances of the case, the Court
held that no “exigency” existed, and that the warrantless and forcible
blood draw amounted to an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment. The Court held that the mere fragility of the evidence
sought could not support a “per se” rule permitting police officers to
1
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908
(1966).
2
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768.
3
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768.
4
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
5
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013).
6
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1556–57.
7
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1557.
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conduct warrantless searches for evidence in the arrestee’s blood in
every driving under the influence case.8
The Court’s decision was based in part on the notion that
advances in modern technology had both simplified and streamlined
the process of obtaining a warrant.9 According to the Court, these
advances in technology expedited the process to such a degree that
officers could now obtain a search warrant for a blood draw relatively
quickly. Thus, the majority concluded, a “per se” rule was both inap-
propriate and unnecessary.10
This recent Supreme Court jurisprudence appears to rely on the
assumptions that modernizations and advances in technology have
made it relatively easy for law enforcement officers to obtain prompt
and expeditious approval of search warrants even in cases where
there is evidence of urgency.11 In support of these assumptions, the
Court cited federal and state rules of procedure that now permit
electronic search warrant applications.12 This is obviously a more
expeditious manner of securing a warrant and a benefit to officers
needing to act with haste.
The law is sometimes criticized as failing to keep up with
technology. Here, however, the question is: has technology kept up
with the law? The Court presumes that because there is a rule of
procedure in place permitting electronic approval of search warrants,
the practice has followed suit. In doing so, the Court has made as-
sumptions of fact about the prevalence of technology, how readily
available that technology is, how well that technology works, and the
ease with which officers can obtain a search warrant in an expedi-
tious manner using that technology. Those assumptions will be
questioned here.
Part II provides information about driving under the influence
crimes and includes the state legislative responses to this
phenomenon. Particular attention will be given to the statutory basis
for warrantless blood draws in Pennsylvania. Part III of this article
will detail the Court’s reasoning in Schmerber v. California, and the
advent of the “per se” rule. Part IV will address various state supreme
court responses to the Schmerber decision. With several states
adopting a “per se” rule, the issue was ripe for eventual U.S.
Supreme Court review. Part V will explain the Court’s reasoning in
Missouri v. McNeely, including the reservations of the Chief Justice
and the dissenting view of Justice Thomas. Part VI will address
8
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1568.
9
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1562.
10
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561–62.
11
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1562.
12
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561.
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some of the High Court’s assumptions of fact about the ease with
which law enforcement officers may obtain search warrants. Part VII
will discuss the very recent Birchfield v. North Dakota case reaffirm-
ing McNeely and going further to address breathalyzer tests
conducted incident to arrest, as well as the constitutionality of impos-
ing criminal penalties for drivers refusing testing. Parts VIII and IX
will challenge the Court’s conclusions and suggest a tentative
avenue for states to explore in the prosecution of drunk driving
cases.
II. Driving Under the Influence Statistics and State Legislative
Responses
A. Statistics
The issue of impaired driving causing numerous annual injuries
and fatalities came to the public light in the 1980’s. A contributing
factor in this evolution of the public consciousness was the founding
of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) in 1980. Researchers
have concluded that: “there is considerable evidence that MADD
has made a difference in the United States regarding alcohol-
impaired drunk driving. MADD has contributed to the public view
that drunk driving is socially unacceptable. MADD has played an
important role in encouraging state legislatures to enact more effec-
tive impaired-driving laws . . .”13
Thanks in large part to this increased public awareness, fatalities
caused by drunk drivers have generally decreased in the United
States. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion (NHTSA), such fatalities decreased from 13,096 in 2003 to
10,322 in 2012. That’s a decline of twenty-one percent.14 While that
number is encouraging, the number of such fatalities actually
increased from 2011 to 2012. In 2011, 9,865 people were killed by
impaired drivers. That means that 4.6 percent more people were
killed by drunk drivers in 2012 than in 2011. The 10,322 people
killed by drunk drivers in 2012 translates to the death of one person
every fifty-one minutes.15 One researcher calculated the rate of driv-
ing under the influence fatalities for each state. He found that
Pennsylvania has one of the highest fatality rates at 3.95 deaths per
13
J. Fell and R. Voas, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD): The First 25
Years, 7 TRAFFIC INJ PREVENTION 3, 195–212 (Jan. 2007) (hereinafter “Fell”).
14
U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), Traffic Safety Data, 2012 Data (hereinafter “NHTSA”).
15
NHTSA, supra note 8.
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100,000 persons. That’s higher than the United States average of
3.88 deaths per 100,000 persons.16
The NHTSA estimates that impaired driving is the primary cause
of thirty-one percent of all traffic fatalities.17 In addition, it is estimated
that the annual cost of alcohol-related traffic accidents is fifty-nine
billion dollars.18
What is more disturbing is the number of drunk driving arrests that
occur every year. The Federal Bureau of Investigation reports that
1,166,824 arrests were made in 2013 for driving under the
influence.19 How many of those arrests prevented serious injuries or
fatalities cannot be estimated. But it is highly probable that those ar-
rests saved lives.
Concurrent with the growth of MADD, media coverage of drunk
driving issues increased substantially. In response, states began to
pass laws addressing the problem and increasing criminal and civil
penalties.20
B. State Legislative Responses
All fifty states now have laws that criminalize the operation of a
motor vehicle by a driver with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent
or greater. Most states impose greater penalties for a higher blood
alcohol level.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, for example, provides a
typical state statute. This state considers all drivers with a blood
alcohol level of 0.08 percent or greater to be impaired. But it lowers
the acceptable level for certain classes of drivers: commercial driv-
ers are impaired at a blood alcohol level of 0.04 percent; school bus
drivers and drivers under the age of twenty-one are impaired at a
blood alcohol level of 0.02 percent.21
Penalties increase for second and subsequent offenders. In addi-
tion, penalties increase for higher blood alcohol levels and include
mandatory prison sentences. Those drivers with a blood alcohol
level of 0.10 percent up to 0.16 percent will be imprisoned for at
least forty-eight hours for a first offense, thirty days for a second of-
16




NHTSA, supra note 8.
18
L. Blincoe, TA Miller, E. Zaloshnja, BA Lawrence, The Economic Impact of
Motor Vehicle Crashes, 2010. Washington (DC): Dept. of Transportation (US),
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) (2014).
19
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, Crime in the United
States 2013, Table 29.
20
Fell, supra note 7 at 197.
21
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802.
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fense, ninety days for a third offense, and one year for a fourth or
subsequent offense.22 Even greater penalties are imposed if the
driver has a blood alcohol level of 0.16 percent or higher. A convicted
drunk driver with those blood alcohol levels must be imprisoned for
at least seventy-two hours for a first offense, ninety days for a
second offense, and one year for a third or subsequent offense.23
Given the commonality of these types of crimes, all states now
have implied consent laws which are based on the notion that driv-
ing is not a right, but a privilege and therefore conditions can be
attached. Under these laws, drivers impliedly consent to a testing of
their blood, breath or urine upon a reasonable request by a police
officer. Failure to consent results in a suspension of the driver’s
license for a period of time which is often one year. The hope was
that this civil penalty would provide a sufficient incentive to drivers to
submit to such tests. However, drivers facing the choice of a license
suspension or possible criminal penalties will often opt for the license
suspension. In fact, researchers have found that these refusals
significantly impair enforcement of drunk driving laws.24
Since drivers can and do refuse to submit to such tests, law
enforcement officers must choose to either forego the tests
altogether or seek a different way to secure the evidence. In seeking
an alternative way, invasive procedures (such as blood draws) are
generally not permitted simply because the driver is being arrested.25
The question then arises, must the officer first undergo the time-
consuming task of obtaining a warrant, or may the evidence be
seized under the exigent circumstances exception to the search
warrant requirement?
III. Schmerber v. California and the “Per Se” Rule
A. Facts
Armando Schmerber and a female companion had spent the night
drinking at a bowling alley and a tavern. At about midnight on
November 24, 1964, Schmerber lost control of his vehicle and ran
into a tree. Both Schmerber and his companion were injured.26 Of-
ficers arrived at the scene shortly thereafter and noted an odor of
alcohol on the defendant’s breath and described his eyes as having
22
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3804.
23
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3804.
24
R.Voas, T. Kelly-Baker, E. Romano and R. Vishnuvajjala; Implied-Consent
Laws: A Review of the Literature and Examination of Current Problems and Related
Statutes, 40 J.SAFETY RES. 77–83 (2009) (hereinafter “Voas”).
25
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770; see also Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S.
——— (2016).
26
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758 n.2.
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a “bloodshot, watery, sort of a glassy appearance.”27 Schmerber and
his companion were taken to the hospital for treatment of minor
injuries.28 Approximately two hours later, an officer arrived at the
hospital and noted that Schmerber continued to exhibit signs of
drunkenness.29 The officer placed Schmerber under arrest for driving
while intoxicated, a misdemeanor under California law. Schmerber
was then informed of his right to counsel and right to remain silent.30
Schmerber refused to consent to a blood test.31 Thereafter, a
physician at the hospital performed the test at the officer’s direction
and over the objection of the defendant.32 The test results provided
evidence that the defendant was driving under the influence of
alcohol.33 The test results were admitted at his trial and he was
convicted. He appealed his conviction to the California Supreme
Court and thereafter to the United States Supreme Court.
B. Issues Raised
The defendant raised a plethora of issues. He asserted that the
following Constitutional rights had been violated: Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process, Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination, and the Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
1. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim
The defendant claimed that the forcible taking of his blood was
akin to the warrantless pumping of the defendant’s stomach in
Rochin v. California.34 In that case, officers observed the defendant
swallowing something as they entered his residence. They later ar-
ranged for his stomach to be pumped and discovered the evidence
to be narcotic pills.35 The Court overturned the defendant’s convic-
tion finding that the warrantless invasion of the defendant’s body
“shocked the conscience” and was in fact “brutal and “offensive”.36
The Court concluded that the defendant’s right to fundamental fair-
27
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769.
28
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758.
29
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769.
30
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769.
31
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759.
32
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758.
33
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758–59.
34
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d
1396 (1952).
35
Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166.
36
Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
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ness under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause had
been violated.37 Rochin’s conviction was overturned.
The Schmerber Court found that a later case, Breithaupt v. Abram38
was more applicable and relatable to the facts. In Breithaupt the
defendant was the driver of a truck involved in a terrible accident
which resulted in the deaths of three people. The defendant was
also injured and unconscious.39 He was transported to a local
hospital. Officers at the hospital noted an odor of alcohol on the
defendant’s person and requested that the attending physician take
a blood sample.40 The test results showed that the defendant’s BAC
was 0.17 percent.41 He was thereafter convicted of involuntary
manslaughter.
The defendant in Breithaupt later appealed his conviction on the
grounds that the warrantless taking of his blood while he was
unconscious violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.42 The Court disagreed. Justice Clark, writing for the
majority, said that blood tests like those administered to the
defendant had become routine in society. There was nothing “of-
fensive” or “brutal” about the simple drawing of blood, even from an
unconscious defendant by a competent and careful physician under
appropriate medical protocols.43 The Court further noted that such a
test is considered more scientifically reliable than human observa-
tion and may very well exonerate or incriminate an accused.44 The
defendant’s conviction was affirmed.
Relying heavily on Breithaupt, the High Court rejected Schmerber’s
claim of a denial of fundamental fairness in the taking of his blood.
The Court noted that, like Breithaupt, the police had probable cause
to arrest and probable cause to believe there was evidence of a
crime in the defendant’s blood. According to the Court, there was,
and is, nothing that “shocks the conscience” or is “brutal” or “of-
fensive” about subjecting an arrestee to a routine medical procedure
conducted by competent and qualified medical personnel in a safe
and medically accepted manner.45 Schmerber’s due process claim
was summarily rejected.
37
Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
38
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S. Ct. 408, 1 L. Ed. 2d 448 (1957).
39
Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 433.
40
Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 433.
41
Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 433.
42
Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 434.
43
Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 436.
44
Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 439.
45
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 760.
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2. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Claim
The High Court also rejected the defendant’s claim under the
Sixth Amendment. Schmerber claimed that because he had refused
to consent to a test of his blood on the advice of his attorney, he
was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.46
He argued that the failure of the police to respect his refusal
amounted to a denial of the right simply because his refusal was
made on the advice of counsel. The Court rejected this argument
because Schmerber had no right to counsel to assert at that point.47
3. Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Claim
More troubling for the Court was Schmerber’s claim that the forc-
ible taking of his blood and the subsequent admission of its written
test results at trial, in essence, compelled him to be a witness against
himself.48 A similar claim had been rejected in Breithaupt because
the Fifth Amendment proscription against self-incrimination had not
yet been mandated in the states.49 Given the now mandatory ap-
plication of the self-incrimination clause in state courts, the issue
was ripe for review.
The majority recognized that the taking of Schmerber’s blood over
his objection and at the direct order of the police amounted to
“compulsion”. But more important for the Court to consider was the
issue of whether Schmerber was compelled “to be a witness against
himself” in violation of the Fifth Amendment.50 The Court noted that
the purpose of the self-incrimination clause is to require the state to
secure incriminating evidence by its own efforts, and not by forcibly
extracting damning evidence from the accused.51 It favorably
referenced Justice Holmes’ rationale in Holt v. United States.52 In
that case, the accused was forced to put on a blouse.53 He later ap-
pealed his conviction for murder, arguing, inter alia, that displaying
his person wearing the incriminating blouse violated the Fifth Amend-
ment proscription against being a “witness against himself”. Justice
Holmes rejected this argument saying:
But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be wit-
46
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759.
47
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 766.
48
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759.
49
It was not until 1964 that the Court selectively incorporated this clause into
the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.
Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964).
50
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761.
51
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769.
52
Holt v. U.S., 218 U.S. 245, 31 S. Ct. 2, 54 L. Ed. 1021 (1910).
53
Holt, 218 U.S. at 253.
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ness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his
body as evidence when it may be material. The objection in principle
would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and compare his features with
a photograph in proof.54
Mr. Schmerber, according to the Court, was not required to testify,
nor to engage in any communicative act which would trigger the
privilege.55 Thus, the defendant’s Fifth Amendment claim was also
rejected.56
It should be noted that Justices Black and Douglas filed a dissent-
ing opinion diverging from this finding. Those Justices would have
held that Schmerber’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination had been violated, in essence, because the testimony
of the laboratory technician who analyzed the blood was both
“testimonial” and “communicative” in nature and such testimony was
necessarily derived directly from the forcible compulsion of the
defendant.57 Justice Fortas concurred in this dissent.58
4. Fourth Amendment Claim
Schmerber finally claimed that the insertion of a needle into his
arm was a “search”. He further asserted that the extraction of blood
from his vein was a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.59
In light of this, the Court was forced to decide, as a matter of first
impression, whether such intrusion into the body by the state without
a judicially approved search warrant violated the reasonableness
standards of the Fourth Amendment. The Court reiterated its core
principle that searches supported by judicially approved warrants
are preferred: “the importance of informed, detached and deliberate
determinations of the issue whether or not to invade another’s body
in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great.”60
On this point, the court has also recognized exceptions to the
search warrant requirement. In this case, it considered the officer’s
sense of urgency not only reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
54
Holt, 218 U.S. at 253.
55
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
56
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
57
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 774.
58
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 778–79.
59
The Court was not required to consider this argument in the 1957 Breithaupt
case, as the exclusionary rule had not yet been selectively incorporated. This was
accomplished in the 1961 case of Mapp v. Ohio. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.
Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 86 Ohio L. Abs. 513, 84 A.L.R.2d 933 (1961).
60
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
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but also sufficient to obviate the warrant requirement.61 The Court
recognized the evanescent nature of the evidence and the time that
had elapsed as the officers investigated the accident scene and
transported the defendant to the hospital. Under the circumstances,
the Court found it reasonable for the officer to conclude that he did
not have time to locate a magistrate and secure a warrant.62 The
defendant’s conviction was affirmed.
C. Rejection of a “Per Se” Rule
The Court based its decision upon the unique facts of the case.
The officer in the present case, however, might reasonably have
believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay
necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened
‘the destruction of evidence.’ Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364,
367. We are told the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to
diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate
it from the system. Particularly in a case such as this, where time had
to be taken to bring the accused to the hospital and to investigate the
scene of the accident, there was not time to seek out a magistrate and
secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that the at-
tempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an
appropriate incident to petitioner’s arrest.63 (emphasis added)
Before concluding, Justice Brennan added an additional warning:
It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on the
facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual’s person is a
cherished value of our society. That we today hold that the Constitu-
tion does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual’s
body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it
permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other
conditions.64
In doing so, the Court essentially rejected a bright line “per se” rule
that would permit nonconsensual warrantless testing of a defendant’s
blood in all drunk driving cases.
IV. State Responses to Schmerber
The Court’s warning in Schmerber was a clear rejection of a “per
se” rule that would permit law enforcement officers to order a blood
draw solely upon a showing of probable cause to believe the
defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. But this
warning was unheeded by some law enforcement professionals who
assumed that the evanescent nature of alcohol in the bloodstream in
and of itself posed an exigency sufficient to justify the waiver of a
warrant in cases where there was probable cause to believe a driver
61
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
62
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770–71.
63
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770–71.
64
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.
THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE “PER SE” RULE
119© 2017 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 53 No. 1
was intoxicated. Predictably, the constitutionality of such warrantless
blood draws was raised by defendants in state courts, providing
those courts with the opportunity to review the wisdom or folly of
adopting a “per se” rule.
Several state supreme courts interpreted Schmerber as specifi-
cally authorizing a “per se” rule. A smaller number of state supreme
courts held otherwise. Those courts concluded that that the
evanescent nature of the evidence was merely a factor to be
considered in determining whether an exigency existed sufficient to
obviate the need for a warrant.
Some state courts relied on Justice Brennan’s reference to arrest
in the Schmerber decision: “Given these special facts, we conclude
that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this
case was an appropriate incident to petitioner’s arrest.”65 These
courts were ready to assume that the search of the arrestee’s blood
was permitted simply because the defendant had been arrested.
They likened a search of the arrestee’s blood with the seizure of a
sample of the arrestee’s hair, a clearly non-invasive procedure.
Other state courts soundly rejected such reasoning.
Several state supreme courts relied on Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives’ Ass’n66 to provide federal heft to their positions. In that
case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that blood and urine testing of
railway employees involved in an accident resulting in injury or
substantial property damage was constitutionally permissible. This
was so even if officials did not have 1) probable cause to believe the
employee was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of
the accident, 2) consent of the employee, or 3) a judicially approved
warrant.67 The Skinner Court cited Schmerber’s recognition of the
rapid destruction by normal metabolic processes of alcohol in the
blood, and asserted that “the delay necessary to procure a warrant
nevertheless may result in the destruction of valuable evidence.”68
The Court noted that requiring an official to first obtain a warrant
would defeat the very purpose of the testing which is to ascertain
the level of incapacitation, if any, of the employee.69
65
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
66
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402,
103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 4 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 224, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2857, 13 O.S.H.
Cas. (BNA) 2065, 49 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 38791, 111 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P
11001, 1989 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) P 28476 (1989).
67
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624, 633.
68
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623.
69
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623.
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Other state supreme court justices in either majority or dissenting
opinions objected to the reliance on Skinner.70 They asserted that
the conduct permitted in Skinner constituted an administrative
search, not a search for criminal investigative purposes. In fact, the
Skinner Court stressed that the normal warrant and individualized
suspicion requirements for criminal search warrants were not ap-
plicable to the testing of the railway employees because the purpose
of the administrative search was to “prevent accidents and casual-
ties in railroad operations that result from impairment of employees
by alcohol or drugs,”71 not to pursue a criminal prosecution.
Some courts justified the adoption of a “per se” rule on the reason-
ing provided by the High Court in Cupp v. Murphy.72 The defendant
in Cupp agreed to come to the police station to answer questions
about the strangulation murder of his wife. Police noticed a dark
substance under the defendant’s fingernails which they suspected
was blood, perhaps that of the victim.73 The officer asked the
defendant for permission to take a sample and the defendant
refused.74 The defendant then hid his hands behind his back and ap-
peared to be rubbing his fingers together. Thereafter he put his
hands in his pockets and seemed to be using metal (keys or coins)
to destroy the evidence.75 Alarmed, the officers then detained the
defendant and forcibly secured a sample of the blood beneath his
fingernails.76 No warrant was obtained. The U.S. Supreme Court
held that the search was permissible without a warrant because it
was “necessary to preserve the highly evanescent evidence found
under his fingernails.”77
Still, other state supreme courts cited federal cases to support
one hypothesis over another. But these cases were inapt in many
respects.
United States v. Reid,78 for example, used an exigent circum-
stances rationale to justify the warrantless use of a breathalyzer to
ascertain blood alcohol levels of a defendant stopped for drunk driv-
70
See for example, State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993)
(Abrahamson dissenting).
71
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
72
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 93 S. Ct. 2000, 36 L. Ed. 2d 900 (1973).
73
Cupp, 412 U.S. at 292.
74
Cupp, 412 U.S. at 292.
75
Cupp, 412 U.S. at 296.
76
Cupp, 412 U.S. at 292.
77
Cupp, 412 U.S. at 296.
78
U.S. v. Reid, 929 F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1991).
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ing where no accident had occurred.79 Because a blood draw is an
invasive procedure, whereas the analysis of one’s breath is not, the
ensuing analysis could not logically be used to justify a warrantless
blood draw.
United States v. Eagle80 involved a fatal automobile accident. The
driver was subjected to a nonconsensual warrantless blood draw
two hours after the accident.81 The defendant raised the constitution-
ality of the admission of the blood test results at his trial for the first
time on appeal; he had not preserved the issue by raising it before
the trial court. Nevertheless, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight
Circuit noted that the existence of sufficient probable cause to
believe that evidence would be found in the defendant’s blood,
coupled with the two hour lapse between the accident and the blood
test were sufficient facts to justify the warrantless blood draw.82 The
court did not find it necessary to discuss the “per se” rule, nor to
juxtapose it against the “totality of the circumstances” approach.
United States v. Talkington83 involved the warrantless search of a
home which the prosecution attempted to justify under the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. The Court
noted that where there is a question as to exigency, the prosecution
has the burden of showing that a warrant could not be obtained in
an expeditious manner.84 While the discussion of the legislative
purpose of rules allowing electronic warrant approvals was informa-
tive, the search of a home requires a very different legal analysis
than a search which requires invasion of a defendant’s body. In ad-
dition, the evidence of exigency in the case was notably weak and
based upon a substantial amount of speculation by the officers. By
contrast, the deterioration of alcohol in the blood is not subject to
such conjecture.
A. States Adopting a “Per Se” Rule
Some state supreme courts explicitly adopted a “per se” rule after
the Schmerber case. Others simply declined to engage in a discus-
sion of whether the police had time to secure a warrant. In some
cases, there was a clear misreading of Schmerber; in others, the
state supreme courts simply took a liberal view of the reasoning in
Schmerber.
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Mississippi — Gregg v. State85
Thirteen years after Schmerber, the Mississippi Supreme Court
weighed in on the issue. The defendant was driving a pickup truck
when it crossed the center line and collided with an oncoming
vehicle, killing the passenger in that vehicle.86 Officers arriving at the
scene noted that the defendant exhibited signs of intoxication includ-
ing an odor of alcohol, a “thick tongue”, and “trouble standing”.87 The
defendant was arrested at the scene. One of the officers obtained a
judicially approved warrant to secure a blood sample from the
defendant.88 At a local hospital, the warrant was executed and quali-
fied medical personnel conducted the blood draw.89 The defendant’s
motion to suppress was denied and he was subsequently convicted
of manslaughter. On appeal, the defendant challenged the validity of
the search warrant and argued that the blood test results should
have been suppressed.90
The state Supreme Court opined that the validity, or lack thereof,
of the warrant was essentially irrelevant.91 The Court held that the
officers would have been lawfully justified in securing a blood sample
even without a warrant under the circumstances of the case. Specifi-
cally,
The arrest being legal . . . the officers had the right to react reason-
ably to the emergency situation — which was the potential loss of the
evidence caused by the fact that the percentage of alcohol in the blood
begins to diminish shortly after the drinking stops. Given the legal ar-
rest and an emergency, the officers could, without any warrant attempt
to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content as an appropriate incident
to that arrest.92
Because the officers did in fact obtain a warrant, the state court
found it unnecessary to engage in a discussion of the difficulty of
obtaining one. The state court concluded that a lawful arrest, coupled
with an exigency were sufficient to support a warrantless blood
draw.93 Although conflating searches permitted incident to a lawful
custodial arrest with those justified by exigent circumstances the
85
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Court had little trouble finding that fragility of the evidence was suf-
ficient to justify the warrantless seizure of a blood sample.94
Maine — State v. Baker95
Six years later, the supreme courts of Maine and Arizona ad-
dressed the issue. In State v. Baker the Maine Supreme Court
decided a case involving a two-car collision resulting in the death of
the passenger of one of the vehicles.96 Officers arriving at the scene
were able to determine that one driver had ignored a stop sign and
was obviously under the influence of alcohol.97 The typical signs of
alcohol consumption were present: a strong odor of alcohol on the
defendant, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and unsteady gait.98
Empty beer bottles were found in the defendant’s car and near the
deceased passenger lying beside the highway.99 The defendant was
transported to a local hospital where medical personnel, acting at
the direction of the police, drew blood from the defendant.100 The
defendant was subsequently placed under arrest and charged with
manslaughter, driving under the influence, and furnishing alcohol to
minors. His motion to suppress the blood test results was granted
and the state appealed.101
The trial court had interpreted Schmerber to hold that warrantless
blood test results are admissible only when the blood draw occurred
incident to a lawful custodial arrest.102 The Maine Supreme Court
disagreed and held that arrests were not intrinsic to the Schmerber
reasoning. Instead, Schmerber relied on a straightforward analysis
of probable cause and exigent circumstances.103 The defendant had
only challenged the sufficiency of probable cause in his original
motion. He did not address or challenge the existence of an
exigency. Nevertheless, the Maine Supreme Court, finding sufficient
probable cause to arrest, and sufficient probable cause to believe
evidence of intoxication would be found in the defendant’s blood,
concluded that exigent circumstances did indeed exist. “The bodily
process that eliminates alcohol also provides exigent circumstances
obviating the need to obtain a warrant prior to administering a blood
94
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test.”104 The Court found that the evidence of probable cause itself
also supported a finding of exigency.105
Arizona — State v. Cocio106
In State v. Cocio the Arizona Supreme Court was faced with a
vehicular fatality. The defendant was driving a truck which collided
with another vehicle, killing its passenger.107 Officers arrived at the
scene shortly thereafter. Three officers separately concluded that
the defendant was intoxicated as he smelled of alcohol, swayed as
he stood, and had bloodshot eyes as well as dilated pupils.108
Hospital personnel took the defendant’s blood for medical purposes,
and police obtained some of this sample for testing.109 The defendant
was not under arrest at the time.110 Police did not seek or obtain a
search warrant before obtaining the sample.111 Police laboratory
tests revealed a blood alcohol level of 0.28 percent; hospital test
results revealed a blood alcohol level of 0.29 percent.112
The defendant was convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment.113 He appealed his conviction and sentencing on
multiple grounds, one of which was the warrantless seizure and test-
ing of his blood by police. The Arizona Supreme Court found it
necessary to address the state’s implied consent law,114 as it com-
monly governed the administration of blood tests in driving under the
influence cases. The implied consent law purportedly required that
the defendant be under arrest before being subjected to such a test.
Relying on Schmerber, the state supreme court held that an arrest is
not a necessary prerequisite to the taking of a defendant’s blood.115
The Arizona Supreme Court, like other state supreme courts,
relied on both Cupp and Schmerber to conclude that a defendant’s
blood may be drawn for police testing purposes without a warrant
and without the defendant’s consent under specific circumstances.
Those circumstances include probable cause to believe the
defendant has operated a vehicle while intoxicated and the existence
104
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of exigent circumstances.116 Even when those circumstances exist,
the procedure must be conducted in a reasonable manner by
competent medical personnel.117 The Court concluded that exigent
circumstances existed here because “the highly evanescent nature
of alcohol in the defendant’s blood stream guaranteed that the
alcohol would dissipate over a relatively short period of time.”118
The defendant posed a second argument to the Court. He claimed
that once the vial of blood was provided to the police by medical
personnel, police had an obligation to then obtain a search warrant.119
He argued that the exigency had passed as the blood was no longer
subject to metabolic processes, and the officers had sufficient time
to create the warrant and seek its approval. The defendant relied on
prior U.S. Supreme Court cases that held that once police seize a
closed container, they must obtain a search warrant before opening
that container.120 The Court rejected this argument stating that in the
defendant’s cited cases, the contents of the closed containers were
unknown to the police. Law enforcement officers in those cases
obtained a search warrant to ascertain the contents.121 In the instant
case, the Court opined that the vial containing the blood was not the
subject of seizure; rather the content of the vial itself was the subject
of the seizure. Therefore, since the seizure of the blood was valid,
the subsequent testing was equally valid.122
Oregon — State v. Milligan123
In State v. Milligan the defendant was charged with negligent
homicide after the vehicle he was driving crashed into a power pole,
killing his passenger.124 Evidence showed that the defendant had
been traveling at speeds up to ninety-five miles per hour, and a wit-
ness who had been drinking with the defendant prior to the accident
said the defendant was “smashed”.125 In addition, the responding of-
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ficer noticed an odor of alcohol on the defendant’s breath.126 The
defendant was subsequently transported to the hospital by police. At
the hospital two blood samples were drawn, two hours apart, at the
direction of the police.127 The defendant was not under arrest at the
time, nor did he consent to the blood draw. A search warrant was
not sought nor obtained.128 The defendant was convicted and
appealed.
The defendant objected to the admission of the blood test results
at his criminal trial on the grounds that 1) he was not arrested at the
time, 2) the police did not have probable cause to search, and 3) the
police did not have a search warrant.129 The Oregon Supreme Court
held that the securing of the defendant and transport to the hospital
constituted a “seizure” of his person sufficient to meet constitutional
requirements.130 The Court also held that the officers had sufficient
probable cause to search given the statements of the witnesses, the
severity of the accident, and the odor of alcohol on the defendant’s
breath.131
The Court then concluded that the evidence was lawfully obtained
as “the defendant was a vessel containing evidence of the crime he
had committed . . . evidence that was dissipating with every breath
he took.”132 Relying on the fragility of the evidence, and not on an
examination of the ease with which a warrant could be obtained, the
court stated: “warrantless search and seizure under such circum-
stances therefore is constitutionally justified, unless a warrant can
be obtained without sacrificing the evidence.”133
The defendant argued that even if the first blood draw could be
lawfully justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the
search warrant requirement, the second blood draw could not. The
defendant asserted that it was incumbent upon the state to prove
that obtaining a telephonic warrant was not possible within a reason-
able time frame.134 This would have been an intriguing argument had
the defendant raised it at the lower court. Because he did not, the
Oregon Supreme Court refused to address it.135
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Idaho — State v. Woolery136
The defendant was driving his pickup truck late in the evening of
January 31, 1987.137 At approximately 10:30pm, he ignored a stop
sign, and at a high rate of speed hit an automobile killing the pas-
senger and seriously injuring the driver.138 Police arrived within five
minutes.139 Because the defendant had sustained both head and
chest injuries, he was immediately transported to a local emergency
room.140 The treating physician indicated to the investigating officer
that he believed the defendant to be intoxicated.141 The investigating
officer thereafter requested that medical personnel conduct a blood
draw.142 The defendant’s blood alcohol content was 0.16 percent,
well over the legal limit.143 The defendant was charged and
subsequently filed a motion to suppress the blood test results. The
motion was denied and he was convicted of vehicular manslaughter
and other offenses.144
His appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court raised multiple issues.
First, the defendant argued that he had not been asked to submit to
a blood test as was required under state law.145 Idaho’s implied
consent law146 presumes consent to a test for alcohol or a controlled
substance as long as the officer has reasonable cause to make the
request and the test is administered in a reasonable fashion. Under
the law, however, the driver must first be informed of his right to
refuse such test and the consequences of such refusal such as
license suspension.147 For these reasons, the defendant argued that
the blood tests results should have been suppressed.
State implied consent laws have complicated these issues. Here,
the defendant argued that the officer’s failure to inform him of his
right to refuse to consent to such testing and the consequences for
such refusal should result in suppression of the blood test results.148
But Idaho’s law clearly provided that the penalty for refusal of a
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reasonable request for the testing to be suspension of the driver’s
license.149 The Idaho Supreme Court made a sharp distinction
between the state legislature’s intent to provide a civil penalty for
refusal and the lawful gathering of evidence in a criminal
investigation.150 The Court held that there was no basis for suppres-
sion of this evidence in a criminal proceeding. The defendant’s
recourse under the state’s implied consent law would be reinstate-
ment of his license to drive.151
Second, the defendant argued that he did not consent to the blood
draw, and therefore such an intrusion could only be justified by a
finding of probable cause. The defendant asserted that at the time
the officer requested the administration of the blood test he had not
investigated the accident scene, nor had the officer questioned him
or the witnesses.152 Therefore, the defendant argued that the officer
did not have the requisite probable cause to support the request for
the testing.153
The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the defendant’s manner
of driving — speeding through a stop sign, coupled with the treating
physician’s opinion that he was intoxicated, provided the officer with
sufficient evidence to meet Fourth Amendment probable cause
requirements.154 The court further reasoned that a search warrant
was not needed. Relying on Schmerber, the Court stated: “In the
instant situation, the destruction of the evidence by metabolism of
alcohol in the blood provides an inherent exigency which justifies a
warrantless search”.155 Later the Court elaborated: “in Schmerber,
the United States Supreme Court recognized that a warrantless
seizure of the blood of a driver, as long as probable cause exists
and the withdrawal of blood is done in a reasonable fashion, does
comply with the provisions of the Fourth Amendment.”156
The Idaho Supreme Court clearly interpreted Schmerber as adopt-
ing a “per se” rule authorizing evidentiary testing for alcohol or
controlled substances in a driver’s blood without a warrant, as long
as the officer has probable cause to search and the testing is done
in a reasonable manner. The lone dissenter did not challenge the
majority’s reliance on and interpretation of Schmerber. Justice
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treating physician actually communicated his opinion of the
defendant’s intoxication to the officer.157
Wisconsin — State v. Bohling158
This case involved the investigation of a two-car accident. The
responding officer noted that there was an odor of alcohol on the
defendant’s breath, his eyes were bloodshot and he had poor
balance.159 The defendant refused both breathalyzer and blood
tests.160 Consequently, he was transported to a local medical facility
where a blood draw was conducted without a warrant and without
his consent.161 The test results revealed a blood alcohol level of
0.205 percent.162 Bohling was charged with driving while intoxicated
and moved to suppress the blood test results. The Dane County
Circuit Court granted the motion to suppress. The Wisconsin Court
of Appeals affirmed holding that the state failed to prove additional
exigent circumstances beyond the fragility of blood alcohol, to justify
a warrantless seizure.163 The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed.
Relying specifically on Schmerber, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held:
the dissipation of alcohol from a person’s bloodstream constitutes a
sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless blood draw under the follow-
ing circumstances: 1) the blood draw is taken at the direction of a law
enforcement officer from a person lawfully arrested for a drunk-driving
related violation or crime, and 2) there is a clear indication that the
blood draw will produce evidence of intoxication.164
The Court noted that the test to determine whether an exigency
exists is an objective one.165 That test is met if the officer reasonably
believes that a delay in securing a warrant would result in destruc-
tion of evidence.166 The Court held that because the officer had
taken the time to conduct an examination of the accident scene and
to transport the defendant to the hospital, it was reasonable for the
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arresting officer to conclude that taking the time to secure a warrant
would compromise the integrity of the evidence.167
The Court reasoned that Schmerber could logically be interpreted
either of two ways:
the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream alone constitutes
sufficient exigency for a warrantless blood draw to obtain evidence of
intoxication following a lawful arrest for drunk driving . . . or that the
rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream, coupled with an ac-
cident, hospitalization, and the lapse of two hours until arrest, constitute
exigent circumstances for such a blood draw.168
The Court rejected the second interpretation noting that even in
drunk driving cases where no accident occurred, significant time is
spent in the transportation of the defendant to a medical facility for a
blood draw by qualified medical personnel. The Court noted that
such time expenditure is necessary in all drunk driving cases.169
Adopting a bright line rule, the Court relied on a strong state inter-
est in enforcing drunk driving laws. It also referenced the endorse-
ment of such warrantless tests by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Skinner.170 In Skinner, the U.S. Supreme Court held that those
engaging in an activity that involves risk of injury to the public have
a reduced expectation of privacy.171 Thus, railway employees
involved in the operation of the trains may be tested for the pres-
ence of alcohol or a controlled substance after any accident involv-
ing injury or property damage. This warrantless testing may be
conducted without a showing of a reasonable suspicion of alcohol
consumption or drug use, nor assertion of probable cause.172 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court likened the public safety interest iterated
in Skinner with the public safety interest a state has in keeping
drunk drivers off the roads. The Court reasoned that the privacy
interest asserted by a drunk driving arrestee is outweighed by the
public interest in safety on the public highways. “Wisconsin’s interest
in enforcing its drunk driving laws . . . is vital, whereas the resulting
intrusion on individual privacy is minimal.”173
The Wisconsin Supreme Court also noted that under state law, a
blood test conducted within three hours after the event is admissible
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in court without the need for an expert.174 A blood test conducted
more than three hours after the event is admissible only if a qualified
expert provides sufficient evidence of its validity.175 The Court
recognized that evanescent evidence is most reliable when obtained
expeditiously and that extrapolations of blood test results obtained
after delays are speculative.176 The Court also pointed out that
because blood alcohol continues to rise even after consumption has
stopped, it is in the interest of an innocent driver to have a blood test
as close in time to the event as possible. A delay in testing may
actually result in a finding of a higher blood alcohol level than existed
at the time the defendant was driving.177
Hawaii — State v Entrekin178
The defendant was driving his vehicle at approximately 9 a.m.
when it inexplicably crossed the center line, sideswiping the op-
posite guardrail, swerving back into the proper lane and colliding
with a dirt embankment.179 Thereafter, police arrived and observed
the defendant standing outside his vehicle.180 The defendant identi-
fied himself as the driver and sole occupant.181 The officer im-
mediately noticed an odor of alcohol and requested that the driver
perform standard field sobriety tests.182 The driver declined citing a
neck injury from the accident.183 Medical personnel transported the
driver for treatment at a local medical center. At that facility, police
directed a nurse to obtain a sample of the driver’s blood.184 The
defendant did not consent to the seizure. Nor was a search warrant
obtained in advance.185 The defendant was subsequently charged
with driving under the influence of alcohol.
The defendant’s motion to suppress the blood test results was
granted by the trial court.186 The prosecution appealed. At issue was
the correct interpretation of the state’s implied consent law. This
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unique law mandated the testing of a driver’s blood in the event that
the driver was involved in any accident that involved injury or death
to any person.187 The Supreme Court of Hawaii found that mandate
to be constitutionally permissible.188
The defendant also raised constitutional challenges arguing that
since he had not been arrested at the time of the seizure, his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches had been
violated.189 The state supreme court rejected this argument as well
by relying heavily on Schmerber. The court concluded that the police
had probable cause to arrest the defendant and that exigent
circumstances existed justifying the warrantless seizure of the
defendant’s blood.190
While acknowledging a “totality of the circumstances” test as the
appropriate one when determining whether an “exigency” exists,191
the Court did not hesitate to conclude that one did here. Citing
Schmerber, the court stated that “it is undisputed that ‘the percent-
age of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking
stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from its system.’ ’’192 The
Court did not pose any questions about the ability or inability of the
police to secure a warrant in a timely fashion, instead relying solely
on the fragility of the evidence to support the existence of exigent
circumstances.
Minnesota — State v. Shriner193
The defendant caused a head-on collision with another vehicle.
After pursuit by police, she refused to cooperate and was forcibly
removed from her vehicle.194 Although she was uninjured, the driver
of the other vehicle sustained serious injuries.195 Approximately forty-
five minutes after her arrest, medical personnel drew a blood sample
at the request of police. The test results revealed a blood alcohol
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granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Minnesota Court of
Appeals.197 The prosecution appealed.
Interestingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that
Schmerber did not delineate a bright line rule that the evanescent
nature of alcohol in the bloodstream is sufficient evidence of
exigency to permit a warrantless blood draw. The Court, relying on
state precedent, opined that warrantless searches justified by exigent
circumstances could fall into one of two categories: “(1) single factor
exigent circumstances, and (2) in the absence of any of these fac-
tors, a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test.”198 The Court identified
examples of “single factor” exigencies as hot pursuit of a fleeing
felon, imminent destruction or removal of evidence, protection of hu-
man life, likely escape of the suspect, and fire.”199 The Court clarified
that when a single factor constituted an exigency, the “totality of the
circumstances” analysis is unnecessary.200
The Court relied heavily on the Schmerber Court’s discussion of
the fragility of the evidence. The Court then asserted that the
subsequent U.S. Supreme Court case of Cupp v. Murphy201
confirmed the Court’s conclusion that easily destroyed evidence
constitutes an exigency in and of itself.202
Like the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Minnesota Supreme Court
also relied on Skinner’s rationale. The Court in Skinner said that the
whole purpose of securing a blood test after a railway accident
involving injury or property damage would be thwarted if a warrant
were required because “alcohol and other drugs are eliminated from
the bloodstream at a constant rate, and blood and breath samples
taken to measure whether these substances were in the bloodstream
when [an accident] occurred must be obtained as soon as
possible.”203
The Minnesota Supreme Court opined that testing of an arrestee’s
blood within two hours of the accident resulting in injury is important.
With every passing minute, the most probative evidence of this crime
is subjected to destruction by the body’s natural processes. The rapid
dissipation of alcohol in the blood creates single-factor exigent
circumstances that will justify the police taking a warrantless,
nonconsensual blood draw from the defendant, provided that the police
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have probable cause to believe the defendant committed criminal
vehicular operation.204
B. States Rejecting a “Per Se” Rule
Fewer state supreme courts explicitly rejected a bright line rule.
Instead, these states embraced a “totality of the circumstances”
approach. Both state courts found the evidence admissible against
the defendant using this test.
Utah — State v. Rodriguez205
The defendant was charged with vehicular homicide after she
veered into the path of a school bus.206 The crash resulted in severe
injuries to her and the eventual death of her passenger.207 The
defendant and her passenger were transported to separate medical
facilities for treatment.208 Paramedics on the scene informed
investigating officers that the driver smelled of alcohol.209 An open
and partially full bottle of vodka was found in the driver’s purse.210 An
officer was then sent to the hospital to secure a blood sample from
the driver.211 The officer originally went to the hospital where the pas-
senger was being treated and had to backtrack and go to the hospital
where the driver was being treated.212 The officer testified that he
had to wait approximately twenty to twenty-five minutes for a techni-
cian to arrive to draw the defendant’s blood.213 The officer witnessed
the blood draw and noted that the defendant smelled of alcohol, had
bloodshot eyes, and slurred speech.214 The testing revealed that
defendant’s blood alcohol level was 0.39 percent.215
The defendant’s motion to suppress the blood test results was
denied.216 She was subsequently convicted and appealed. The
intermediate appellate court reversed the conviction on the grounds
that the officers had not first obtained a search warrant for the blood
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draw.217 The court held that the evanescent nature of the evidence
would not in and of itself create an exigency sufficient to allow the
officer to forego the warrant requirement.218 The state appealed to
the Utah Supreme Court.
The state Supreme Court interpreted Schmerber as acknowledg-
ing exigency when evidence is fragile, but rejecting a bright line rule
and instead adopting the broader “totality of the circumstances”
test.219 Thereafter, the Court spoke at length about the technological
advances in law enforcement under the continuously evolving rules
of Utah Criminal Procedure that permit electronic approval of search
warrants. The Court noted that “as far back as 1980, the Utah Code
section 77-7-10 allowed a magistrate to issue a warrant by
“telegraph, telephone or other reasonable means.”220 The Court also
noted that Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Procedure states “com-
munications between the magistrate and the peace officer or
prosecuting attorney requesting the warrant may be remotely
transmitted by voice, image, text, or any combination of those, or by
other means.”221
Notwithstanding the state rules permitting more expeditious ways
of securing search warrants, the Utah Supreme Court concluded
that the officers acted within constitutional parameters in securing
the defendant’s blood without a warrant.222 Interestingly, the Court
did not address factors that might have delayed the search warrant
process such as the time to transport the injured to a medical facility,
the time to investigate the scene, and the officer initially going to the
wrong hospital. The Court noted that the seriousness of the ac-
cident, coupled with the strong evidence that alcohol had contributed
to it, were sufficient to meet the standards of the “totality of the
circumstances” test.223
Iowa — State v. Johnson224
At approximately 4:41pm, the defendant caused an automobile
accident which resulted in the serious injury of another.225 He fled the
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scene on foot, but police later found him several blocks away.226 He
failed several field sobriety tests and was taken to the police station
where he refused a blood test at 6:25pm.227 Thereafter he was
transported to a local hospital where blood was taken from him at
7:20pm.228 This blood draw was performed without the defendant’s
consent and without a warrant.229 The test result revealed a blood
alcohol level of 0.250 percent.230 The defendant was subsequently
convicted of multiple offenses, including driving while intoxicated.
The defendant appealed his convictions on the grounds that his
blood had been drawn without a warrant or other justification.
The Iowa implied consent law provided that a nonconsensual
blood draw would be permitted when three conditions were met: 1)
the officer reasonably believed that the test would show evidence of
intoxication, 2) the test was performed by medical personnel in a
reasonable manner, and 3) the officer reasonably believed that the
integrity of the evidence would be threatened by the delay needed to
obtain a warrant.231 The sole question for the court was the third
condition.
The Iowa Supreme Court rejected the notion that Schmerber
embraced a “per se” rule.232 Instead, the state court asserted that
Schmerber in fact specifically rejected such a rule and concluded
that “the evanescence of blood-alcohol was never special enough to
create an exigent circumstance by itself.”233 Instead, a totality of the
circumstances approach was adopted.
The court likened the facts in the instant case with those in
Schmerber. Specifically, it found that the significant lapse in time
caused by the defendant’s actions, and the need for multiple
transports was sufficient to justify the officer’s reasonable belief that
the time needed to obtain a warrant would result in further destruc-
tion of the evidence for which he had probable cause to seize.234
The Court specifically rejected the notion that the availability of
electronic communication with the magistrate mitigated this
exigency.235
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V. Missouri v. McNeely: The Death of the “Per Se” Rule
Forty-seven years after Schmerber, the U.S. Supreme Court reaf-
firmed its essential holding in that case. In Missouri v. McNeely236 the
Court held that no bright line rule would be approved for warrantless
blood draws, despite the uniquely and consistently evanescent
nature of alcohol in a defendant’s blood.
A. Facts
At approximately 2:08am on October 3, 2010, Tyler McNeely was
stopped by a Missouri highway patrolman for speeding and failing to
stay in his lane.237 He failed several field sobriety tests and refused
to submit to a breathalyzer test.238 The officer then placed McNeely
under arrest and transported him to a local hospital to have his
blood drawn for testing.239 The officer asked McNeely if he would
consent to the blood test, warning him that a refusal would result in
a suspension of his driving privileges. McNeely refused.240 The of-
ficer then directed the lab technician to secure the blood sample.241
The time was approximately 2:35am. At no time did the officer at-
tempt to secure judicial authorization for the blood draw.242
B. Majority Opinion
Unlike Schmerber, McNeely did not raise Fifth, Sixth or Fourteenth
Amendment issues. Instead, he argued only that his Fourth Amend-
ment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures had
been violated by the warrantless seizure of the evidence.243
The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the
results of the blood test; the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed.244
The state did not proffer any testimony or facts to support the notion
that exigent circumstances existed in the case. Instead, the state
argued that the Court should adopt a “per se” rule that the
evanescent nature of alcohol in the blood is an exigency in and of
itself sufficient to obviate the need for a judicially approved warrant
to secure a sample.245
Because lower courts were divided on this issue, the Supreme
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Court granted certiorari to determine whether “the natural dissipation
of alcohol in the bloodstream establishes a per se exigency that suf-
fices on its own to justify an exception to the warrant requirement for
nonconsensual blood testing in drunk-driving investigations.”246
Justice Sotomayor, writing for the majority, stated that the
“importance of requiring authorization by a ‘neutral and detached
magistrate’ before allowing a law enforcement officer to invade
another’s body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and
great.”247 She further noted that a long-accepted exception to the
search warrant requirement exists “when the exigencies of the situa-
tion make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a war-
rantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.”248
The Court has recognized such exigencies when a resident needs
emergency assistance, when officers are in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing
suspect, for the entry into a burning building to investigate the cause
of the fire, and to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.249
However, under each of these circumstances, the Court looked to
the “totality of the circumstances” to determine the extent and suf-
ficiency of the exigency.
The Court noted that this same test was applied in the original
Schmerber decision. In Schmerber, the lapse of time between the
crime of drunk driving and the blood draw caused by the investiga-
tion of the accident scene and the need to transport the suspect to
the hospital for treatment, amounted to approximately two hours.250
The Court also took note of the scientific evidence establishing that
blood alcohol normally dissipates at a rate of approximately 0.02
percent per hour — depending on gender, weight and individual
tolerance of alcohol.251 In the instant case, however, there was a
very short period of time between the arrest (2:08am) and the blood
draw (2:35am). Therefore, it would appear that the officer had suf-
ficient time to obtain a warrant without jeopardizing the accuracy of
the test results.
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Accordingly, the Court held “in those drunk driving investigations
where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood
sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy
of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates they do so.”252 The
Court also took note of the advances in communication that have
occurred since the 1966 Schmerber case. The Court asserted that
officers in many jurisdictions can now obtain a search warrant ap-
proval by telephone, email, or video conferencing.253 According to
the Court, these developments further support the notion that a “per
se” rule is unnecessary.
It should be noted that the burden is on the state to prove (by a
preponderance of the evidence) that an exception to the search war-
rant requirements exists. In this case, the state’s argument was
notoriously weak. In fact, the officer testified to facts that seriously
undermined the prosecution’s position that a “per se” rule was
advisable. Specifically, the officer testified under oath that:
1) he had made no effort to obtain a search warrant before the
blood draw;
2) he was sure that a prosecutor was on call at the time;
3) he had no reason to believe that a magistrate was unavailable
to review a warrant;
4) he had obtained search warrants in the past without difficulty
before taking a blood draw; and
5) he could not establish a justification for an “exigency excep-
tion” under the facts of this case, but argued that the law
simply did not require him to obtain a warrant in advance of a
blood draw.254
C. Chief Justice Dissent
Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Breyer and Alito, dis-
sented in part. He argued that the known dissipation of alcohol in
the bloodstream, along with disturbing statistics of drunk driving
fatalities (one person died every fifty-three minutes due to drinking
and driving in 2011) make a strong case for the application of the
exigent circumstances exception.255 While essentially agreeing with
the majority’s “totality of the circumstances” approach, Chief Justice
Roberts was troubled by the fact that law enforcement officers doing
their best to comply with the law had received so little guidance from
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the majority.256 The Chief Justice would instead reduce the inquiry to
a single question: “was there time to secure a warrant”?257 Accord-
ingly, he would have remanded the case to the Missouri Supreme
Court to address that specific question.
D. Justice Thomas Dissent
Justice Thomas dissented in whole. He would hold that a “per se”
rule is warranted under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.258
In addition, he noted that the disparities in procedures, technological
capabilities, availabilities of appropriate judicial officers, transporta-
tion distances, transportation delays, hospital personnel availability,
etc. among the states calls for a bright line rule.259 The “facts-and-
circumstances” approach which the majority and even the Chief
Justice adopted would be, in his opinion, much too difficult to
administer.260 Justice Thomas asserted that the relentless destruc-
tion of evidence is a certainty while the ability to obtain a warrant
expeditiously is not. Officers should not be required to guess how
long it will take to obtain a warrant.261
Justice Thomas also noted that it is the prosecutor’s burden to
prove with relative accuracy, the BAC of the driver at the time he or
she was driving the vehicle. In most states, the BAC level determines
the severity of the crime and the ensuing punishment. The greater
the delay between the act of driving and the drawing of the blood
sample, the less accurate the test result will be.262 In many case,
experts must rely on extrapolation to “calculate back” the test results
to determine the BAC at the time the defendant was driving.263 This
leads to less accurate and less reliable evidence, and to a courtroom
“battle of the experts”.264 Nor, Justice Thomas argues, should the
Court force the prosecution to tolerate certain destruction of some
evidence simply because it will not be destroyed in its entirety.265
Justice Thomas hypothesized a case where police witness a person
throwing bundles of marijuana from a larger pile of marijuana
bundles into a burning fire. Would the Court require the police to first
obtain a warrant before securing the remaining bundles simply
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because it was feasible to do so before all of the bundles were
destroyed?266 While not well analogized to an invasion of the body,
his point was well made.
VI. Evidence-based Jurisprudence?
A. The Assumptions
The McNeely majority grounded their ruling in part on the alleged
advances in technology that facilitate warrant acquisition.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended in 1977 to
permit federal magistrate judges to issue a warrant based on sworn
testimony communicated by telephone. See 91 Stat. 319. As amended,
the law now allows a federal magistrate judge to consider ‘information
communicated by telephone or other reliable electronic means’. Fed.
Rule crim. Proc. 4.1. States have also innovated. Well over a majority
of States allow police officers or prosecutors to apply for search war-
rants remotely through various means, including telephonic or radio
communication, electronic communication such as e-mail, and video
conferencing. And in addition to technology-based developments,
jurisdictions have found other ways to streamline the warrant process,
such as by using standard-form warrant applications for drunk-driving
investigations.267
Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissent also noted that “at least 30
States provide for electronic warrant applications.”268 (The Utah
Supreme Court also relied on the notion that electronic advances
authorized under state procedural rules “dramatically pared back the
physical obstacles to warrant acquisition.”)269
B. Challenging the Assumptions
But this is a simplistic approach for at least two reasons: 1) the
fact that a jurisdiction “allows” electronic warrant applications does
not necessarily mean that such processes are readily available, and
2) even electronic processes take time.
Justice Thomas asserted essentially that any delay in the securing
of such evanescent evidence was unacceptable. The existence of
electronic communication to expedite the warrant acquisition process
was therefore irrelevant to the essential inquiry.270 The Minnesota
Supreme Court’s reasoning tracked that of Justice Thomas. Initially
finding that the evanescent nature of alcohol in the blood, in and of
itself, was sufficient evidence of exigency, the Court rejected the
argument that the advent of telephonic warrants supported the war-
rant requirement.
266
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1576 (Thomas, dissenting).
267
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1562.
268
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1572 (Roberts, dissenting).
269
Rodriguez, 156 P.3d at 778.
270
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1578 (Thomas, dissenting).
CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN
142 © 2017 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 53 No. 1
But the officer facing the need for a telephonic warrant cannot be
expected to know how much delay will be caused by following
procedures necessary to obtain such a warrant. And during the time
taken to obtain a telephonic warrant, it is undisputed that the
defendant’s body is rapidly metabolizing and dissipating the alcohol in
the defendant’s blood. We do not believe that the possibility of obtain-
ing a telephonic warrant is sufficient to overcome the single-factor
exigent circumstances of the rapid dissipation of the alcohol in the
defendant’s blood in this case.271
The Iowa Supreme Court found that:
While a telephone warrant might be obtained more quickly than a
traditional warrant, we do not think it would have significantly reduced
the exigency in this case. Obtaining a warrant by telephone is fairly
complicated; an officer cannot simply call up a magistrate and make a
general request for a warrant. The officer must prepare a “duplicate”
warrant and read the duplicate warrant, verbatim, to the magistrate.
The magistrate then must enter, verbatim, what has been read to him
on a form to be considered as the original warrant. (citation omitted)
The oral application must set forth facts and information tending to
establish the grounds for the issuance of the warrant and describe with
reasonable specificity the person whose driving has been involved and
from whom the specimen is to be withdrawn. (citation omitted) Gather-
ing of this information, of course, requires considerable time. If a voice
recording device is available to the magistrate, the magistrate may
record the call, but otherwise “shall cause a stenographic or longhand
memorandum to be made of the oral testimony of the person applying
for the warrant.” (citation omitted) If the magistrate is satisfied that the
grounds for the issuance of the warrant have been established, the
magistrate shall order the issuance of the warrant by directing the of-
ficer applying for it to sign the magistrate’s name to the “duplicate
warrant.”272
So even in jurisdictions that allow and use electronic technology to
obtain warrants, a significant amount of time is still expended to
secure judicial approval.
Pennsylvania provides initial definitions of “advanced communica-
tion technology” and “advanced communication technology site” as
follows:
ADVANCED COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY is any communica-
tion equipment that is used as a link between parties in physically
separate locations, and includes, but is not limited to: systems provid-
ing for two-way simultaneous communication of image and sound;
closed-circuit television; telephone and facsimile equipment; and
electronic mail.
ADVANCED COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY SITE is any approved
location within Pennsylvania designated by the president judge, or the
president judge’s designee, with advanced communication technology
271
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equipment that is available for parties in a criminal matter to com-
municate with others in physically separate locations as provided in
these rules.273
Pennsylvania permits county District Attorneys, at their discretion, to
impose a rule requiring their approval of a warrant application before
taking that warrant to a magisterial district judge or a judge of the
Court of Common Pleas.274
The Pennsylvania rules further indicate that:
(A) In the discretion of the issuing authority, advanced com-
munication technology may be used to submit a search warrant ap-
plication and affidavit(s) and to issue a search warrant.
(B) No search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by one or more affidavits sworn to before the issuing author-
ity in person or using advanced communication technology. The is-
suing authority, in determining whether probable cause has been
established, may not consider any evidence outside the affidavits.
(C) Immediately prior to submitting a search warrant application
and affidavit to an issuing authority using advanced communication
technology, the affiant must personally communicate with the issu-
ing authority by any device which, at a minimum, allows for
simultaneous audio-visual communication. During the communica-
tion, the issuing authority shall verify the identity of the affiant, and
orally administer an oath to the affiant.275
The supporting comments clarifying the rule are as follows:
Paragraph (A) recognizes that an issuing authority either may issue a
search warrant using advanced communication technology or order
that the law enforcement officer appear in person to apply for a search
warrant.
Paragraph (B) does not preclude oral testimony before the issuing
authority, but it requires that such testimony be reduced to an affidavit
prior to issuance of a warrant. All affidavits in support of an application
for a search warrant must be sworn to before the issuing authority prior
to the issuance of the warrant. “Sworn” includes “affirmed.” See Rule
103. The language “sworn to before the issuing authority” contemplates,
when advanced communication technology is used, that the affiant
would not be in the physical presence of the issuing authority.
An affiant seeking the issuance of a search warrant, when permitted
by the issuing authority, may use advanced communication technology
as defined in Rule 103.
When advanced communication technology is used, the issuing author-
ity is required by this rule to (1) determine that the evidence contained
273
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in the affidavit(s) establishes probable cause, and (2) verify the identity
of the affiant. The “visual” requirement in paragraph (C) must allow, at
a minimum, the issuing authority to see the affiant at the time the oath
is administered and the information received.276
As mentioned above, the Pennsylvania rules give county District At-
torneys the authority to require officers to obtain their approval before
submitting a search warrant application to a judge. This requirement
can add significant time to the warrant acquisition process. Further,
the state rules provide judges with the option of requiring the officer
applying for a warrant to appear in person or by electronic device.
Even with an electronic device, simultaneous audio and visual
contact between the officer and the issuing judge is required. In
either case, the judge must have visual contact with the officer,
verify the officer’s identity, and administer the necessary oath. The
officer must then be prepared to recite to the judge an affidavit sup-
porting probable cause for the search and the affidavit must then be
reduced to writing.
But does the existence of procedural rules permitting electronic
technology to secure warrant approval mean that the technology is
in place and readily available? In an attempt to discern the real-life
ease or difficulty of obtaining a search warrant to obtain a blood
sample to test for the presence of alcohol in the blood of a suspected
drunk driver, a short survey was conducted through the Pennsylvania
Association of Chiefs of Police in 2014. Although the response rate
was low (n varied from twenty-seven to thirty-eight depending on the
questions answered), more than half of Pennsylvania’s sixty-seven
counties were represented (Pennsylvania State Police patrol multiple
counties). Jurisdictions represented ranged from fewer than 10
square miles to over 100 square miles.
The officers were asked how long it generally took to obtain a
search warrant during the following times: weekdays, weeknights,
weekend days and weekend nights. Not surprisingly, officers were
able to obtain a search warrant more quickly during the traditional
work week than during weekends. Approximately one-third of the of-
ficers reporting indicated that it took more than three hours to obtain
a search warrant on weekends, when one would expect more drunk
driving stops to occur. Two officers reported that it sometimes took
two to three days to obtain a warrant.
When asked about the factors that affected the officers’ abilities to
obtain a warrant in a timely manner the following responses were
noted:
E Only four percent indicated that there was an insufficient
number of magisterial district justices in the jurisdiction;
E Approximately fourteen percent reported that the magisterial
276
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district justices offices could be too far away from the scene of
the stop to quickly travel to the office;
E Approximately seven percent indicated that the distance the
hospitals were from possible crime scenes adversely affected
their ability to obtain a warrant in a timely manner;
E Fifty percent reported there was no ability to obtain a warrant
remotely using electronic technologies such as phone, fax, etc.;
E Approximately sixty-four percent indicated that they had to cre-
ate the search warrant from scratch — there were no preprinted
forms to adapt;
E Approximately sixty-four percent indicated that magisterial
district justices were not available 24/7, thus hampering their
ability to obtain a warrant quickly.
Included in the survey was an open-ended question about ad-
ditional factors affecting the officers’ ability to obtain a search war-
rant within a reasonable period of time. Respondents volunteered
the following: limited number of officers available; crash investigation
time; time for field sobriety tests; witness and suspect interviews;
traffic control issues; other calls coming in; prisoner transport and
monitoring; search warrant preparation; travel time to magisterial
district justice office; and travel time to the hospital.
It was apparent from the survey that even though Pennsylvania
has rules of procedure allowing for electronic acquisition of warrants,
the technology is not in place in many parts of the state. Nor are
magisterial district justices necessarily available at times when most
drunk driving offenses are likely to occur. In fact, magisterial district
justices are considered part-time employees, and so have no official
obligation to be constantly available to police officers seeking war-
rant approvals. Most magisterial district justice offices are open from
8:30am to 4:30pm and sometimes one evening per week.277 District
justices are much less likely to be available at night or on weekends
when drunk driving arrests more often occur.278
It would be difficult to extrapolate this small Pennsylvania survey
to the rest of the country. But the High Court assumes that technol-
ogy for electronic approval of search warrants is in place, readily
available and in widespread use simply because a state has rules of
procedure permitting such technology. Those assumptions are
unsupported by the evidence, at least in Pennsylvania.
VII. The Most Recent Cases: A Reaffirmation of McNeely and
Beyond
Very recently, the U.S. Supreme Court had the opportunity to
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review its McNeely reasoning. To address the constitutionality of
both warrantless breathalyzer tests and warrantless blood tests in
driving under the influence arrests. The High Court granted certiorari
in three state cases: Bernard v. Minnesota, Beylund v. North Dakota
and Birchfield v. North Dakota. The cases were consolidated under
the case title Birchfield v. North Dakota.279
A. Bernard v. Minnesota - Breathalyzer Test Incident to
Arrest
Police responded to a report of an incident at a local boat launch.
Upon arrival they noted that three obviously intoxicated men were
trying to move a truck that had become stuck in the mud as they
were trying to pull a boat out of the water.280 Witnesses pointed out
the driver, who was clad only in his underwear.281 Bernard refused
field sobriety tests.282 He was arrested and transported to the police
station where he was informed of the state’s implied consent law.283
Most state implied consent laws impose a civil penalty for refusal to
submit to testing upon arrest. The civil penalty is commonly a one-
year license suspension. Minnesota’s law is notable in that it
imposes criminal penalties for refusal to submit to testing. According
to state law, those penalties can range from ninety days to seven
years in prison, and fines ranging from $1,000 to $14,000, the higher
penalties being imposed for repeat offenders.284 Bernard had four
prior drunk driving convictions, so his incentive to refuse was high.285
The Minnesota District Court dismissed the charges on the
grounds that warrantless breath tests violated the Fourth
Amendment. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, and the
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed.286 The Minnesota Supreme
Court concluded that breath tests were permitted as incident to law-
ful custodial arrests.287
The McNeely Court did not address the issue of breath tests, nor
did it speak to searches permissible incident to lawful custodial
arrests. However, because lower courts had demonstrated confusion
about searches permissible incident to arrest and those requiring
judicial approval, the Court felt compelled to address this issue. By
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doing so, the Court clarified Fourth Amendment principles with
regard to searches incident to arrest, and drew cognizable distinc-
tions between breath tests and blood tests.
The permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful custodial
arrest was promulgated initially in the 1969 case of Chimel v.
California.288 Mr. Chimel was arrested in his home for the burglary of
a coin shop.289 Although the officers had an arrest warrant, they did
not have a search warrant.290 As part of the arrest, the officers
searched the defendant’s home and retrieved coins stolen from the
coin shop.291 Mr. Chimel was convicted, in part, on the admission of
that evidence at his trial. He appealed his conviction to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
The Court defined the scope of the search that officers affecting
an arrest may conduct. An arrestee loses Fourth Amendment protec-
tions in his person and in the area within his reach or control simply
by virtue of the lawful custodial arrest.292 For this area, officers do
not need probable cause to search. To initiate this search, officers
do not need to have an object, nor even a class of objects in mind.
The rationale for permitting such a search was to ensure officer
safety and to prevent the arrestee from destroying evidence.293
Because the officers had conducted a search well beyond the
defendant’s “reach or control”, the Court overturned the conviction.
Four years later, the Court held that officers conducting a search
incident to a lawful custodial arrest are not required to limit their
search to objects related to the charges for which the defendant is
being arrested. Officers are permitted to search the arrestee and the
area within his reach or control for anything.294
In 2014, the High Court reviewed the question of whether officers
may retrieve information from an arrestee’s cellphone without a war-
rant as a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest.295 Answering in
the negative, the High Court iterated its balancing of two competing
interests: “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [the
search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy, and on the other, the
288
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degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.”296
Applying this balancing test to the instant case, the High Court
noted that breath tests are not invasive and are generally “no more
demanding than blowing up a party balloon.”297 The Court also noted
that exhalation of air is a natural and essential process. Therefore,
citizens have no privacy interests in expelled air. In addition, the
Court had already found that fingernail scrapings298 and DNA swabs299
are minimal intrusions easily counterbalanced by lawful governmental
interests.
Interestingly, the Court made special note of the fact that breath
tests do not result in the seizure of evidence that is preservable by
the government.300 Authorities cannot use one’s breath, under cur-
rent scientific acumen, to assess other biological traits. Thus, the
Court reasoned, the invasion of an arrestee’s privacy interests is
minimal. Finally, the Court reasoned that breath tests are not a
particularly embarrassing or humiliating experience for arrestees.301
For all of those reasons, the Court held that the administration of
a breathalyzer test incident to a lawful custodial arrest was permis-
sible under the Fourth Amendment. Law enforcement officers may
now administer such tests in every case where they have probable
cause to believe the individual was driving under the influence of
alcohol.302 Accordingly, the officers in this case were not required to
obtain a warrant to administer a breathalyzer test, and the defendant
had no right to refuse it.
B. Beylund v. North Dakota — Criminal Penalties for
Refusal
A police officer noted Beylund having difficulty trying to steer his
car from the roadway into a driveway, nearly hitting a nearby stop
sign.303 The officer noted an empty wine glass in the car and an odor
296
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of alcohol on the defendant’s breath.304 The defendant staggered as
he attempted to exit the vehicle.305 The defendant was arrested and
transported to a hospital. He was informed that refusal to submit to a
blood test would result in criminal penalties under North Dakota
law.306 The defendant consented to the test. The results indicated
that his blood alcohol level was 0.250 percent.307 The test results
triggered a two year license suspension which the defendant
appealed.308
The defendant argued that his consent was coerced and could not
be voluntary because refusal itself was a crime under state law.309
The North Dakota District Court rejected this argument and the
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. The state high court
reasoned that the implied consent advisory simply truthfully stated
the penalties for refusal.310 The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider the constitutionality of criminal penalties for
refusal by drunk driving arrestees to submit to blood tests.
C. Birchfield v. North Dakota — Criminal Penalties for
Refusal
A North Dakota state trooper observed the defendant attempting
to extract his car from a ditch into which he had driven off the
highway.311 The trooper noted that Birchfield’s eyes were bloodshot
and watery and his speech was slurred.312 In addition, the defendant
emitted a strong odor of alcohol and he was unsteady on his feet.313
Birchfield failed the field sobriety tests administered by the trooper.314
The trooper informed the defendant of the state’s implied consent
law; the defendant then agreed to a roadside (preliminary) breatha-
lyzer test used to determine whether more reliable tests should be
administered. This roadside test revealed a blood alcohol level of
0.254 percent.315
The defendant was then arrested and advised of the penalties
304
Birchfield, 579 U.S. ——— slip op. at 11.
305
Birchfield, 579 U.S. ——— slip op. at 11.
306
Birchfield, 579 U.S. ——— slip op. at 11–12.
307
Birchfield, 579 U.S. ——— slip op. at 12.
308
Birchfield, 579 U.S. ——— slip op. at 12.
309
Birchfield, 579 U.S. ——— slip op. at 12.
310
Beylund v. Levi, 2015 ND 18, 859 N.W.2d 403 (N.D. 2015).
311
Birchfield, 579 U.S. ——— slip op. at 8.
312
Birchfield, 579 U.S. ——— slip op. at 8.
313
Birchfield, 579 U.S. ——— slip op. at 8.
314
Birchfield, 579 U.S. ——— slip op. at 8.
315
Birchfield, 579 U.S. ——— slip op. at 8–9.
CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN
150 © 2017 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 53 No. 1
under state law for refusing further testing.316 North Dakota law
imposes criminal penalties for refusing such tests ranging from fines
of $500 to $2,000 and imprisonment of one year and a day for repeat
offenders.317 The defendant had recently plead guilty to a prior drunk
driving offense, and refused to consent to a blood test.318 He entered
a conditional plea to a violation of the state’s refusal statute. He
argued that imposing criminal penalties for refusing blood testing
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.319 The North Dakota Supreme
Court denied his appeal320 and the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
The U.S. Supreme Court reiterated its holding in Missouri McNeely.
It reaffirmed the principle that for officers to forego the warrant
requirement for blood draws in drunk driving cases, “exigent
circumstances” must be proven.321 The evanescent nature of alcohol
in the bloodstream is insufficient evidence, standing alone, of an
exigency.322 Officers must prove that they did not have, under the
circumstances presented to them, sufficient opportunity to obtain a
warrant in a timely manner.323
The High Court drew a sharp distinction between testing of a
driver’s breath and testing of a driver’s blood. Justice Alito, writing
for a strong majority, opined that blood tests are not only a physical
intrusion into the body but result in the extraction of biological
evidence.324 He noted that the evidence can then be retained by
authorities for use in a variety of ways unrelated to the prosecution
of a drunk driving charge.325 The Court concluded that while
breathalyzer tests can be administered incident to a lawful custodial
arrest, the intrusive nature of blood tests must be supported by a
search warrant or by provable exigencies.326
D. State criminal penalties for refusals
The Court acknowledged that the civil penalties mandated in the
implied consent laws of many states are simply insufficient to
persuade the most dangerous drunk driving offenders to consent to
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proper testing.327 The passage by state legislatures of criminal penal-
ties for such refusal is understandable. Indeed, criminal penalties for
refusals were recommended by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration in 2013.328
The High Court acknowledged its oblique approval in McNeely of
civil penalties for motorists who refuse to submit to reasonable test-
ing upon request by a police officer.329 But criminal penalties for such
refusal are a different matter. Generally, a lawful consent must be a
voluntary one. Compulsion is expressly prohibited by the
Constitution.330 According to the Court, criminal penalties for refusal
are a step too far and amount to unlawful coercion. The Court stated,
“there must be a limit to the consequences to which motorists may
be deemed to have consented by virtue of a decision to drive on the
public roads.”331 Accordingly, Beylund’s case was remanded to the
state trial court for a determination of whether his consent to the
blood test was voluntary under the long established “totality of the
circumstances test.”332 Birchfield’s plea was vacated and the case
remanded.333
VIII. Going Forward
A. Did the High Court Err by Rejecting the “Per Se” Rule?
The Utah Supreme Court stated “the mere possibility of delay
does not give rise to exigency.”334 But does the mere possibility of
speed demand the securing of a warrant?
A rule of procedure permitting a law enforcement officer to obtain
electronic approval of a search warrant does not necessarily reduce
the time and effort necessary to obtain that approval. The mere
existence of the rule does not mean that the technology is in place.
If the technology is in place, there is no assurance that it is working
properly. Even if the technology is in place, and is working properly,
it does not mean that a judge will be available to hear the warrant
application. There are too many variables, none of which a police of-
ficer can control or effectively measure. A diligent police officer simply
does not have the means to accurately predict how long it will take
to secure a warrant in any given set of circumstances.
327
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The explanation of the Iowa Supreme Court bears repeating:
Obtaining a warrant by telephone is fairly complicated; an officer can-
not simply call up a magistrate and make a general request for a
warrant. The officer must prepare a ‘duplicate’ warrant and read the
duplicate warrant, verbatim to the magistrate. The magistrate then
must enter, verbatim, what has been read to him on a form to be
considered as the original warrant. The oral application must set forth
facts and information with reasonable specificity the person or persons
whose driving has been involved and from whom the specimen is to be
withdrawn. Gathering of this information of course, requires consider-
able time. If a voice recording device is available to the magistrate, the
magistrate may record on the call, but otherwise ‘shall cause a
stenographic or longhand memorandum to be made of the oral history
of the person applying for the warrant’. If the magistrate is satisfied
that the grounds for the issuance of the warrant have been established,
the magistrate shall order the issuance of the warrant by directing the
officer applying for it to sign the magistrate’s name to the “duplicate”
warrant.335
It would seem that in some instances, a police officer could obtain
a warrant more expeditiously by completing the warrant form and
taking it physically to the nearest magistrate. So the existence of
electronic technology is not necessarily any assurance whatsoever
that the search warrant approval process is any less complicated or
time-consuming.
Justice Roberts reduced the question to simply “did the officer
have time to secure a warrant”?336 But that can be too difficult to
answer. Many times the officer will not know whether he has suf-
ficient time to secure a warrant until he has expended some
significant amount of time to do so. The difficulties, many of which
cannot be foreseen, often arise during the process. As the officer is
dealing with those problems and issues the evidence is disappearing.
As Justice Thomas stated, the ability to obtain a warrant quickly is
uncertain; the destruction of the evidence is certain.337 It is unrealistic
for the High Court to place this obstacle in the path of police officers
who are on the front lines protecting citizens from those who would
drive while impaired. It is these officers who are so often first on ac-
cident scenes, first to see the sometimes devastating injuries that
drunk drivers can cause, and first to inform families that they have
so senselessly lost a loved one.
It could be argued that an inner cheek swab for DNA testing is an
invasive procedure. But that has not been seriously questioned
335
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when conducted by an officer incident to a lawful custodial arrest.338
Interestingly, this evidence is of a kind that can be preserved by
authorities for use in other ways — one of the concerns that led the
majority in Birchfield to reject warrantless blood draws. In addition
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that arrestees may be strip-
searched before entering prison, even when the offense giving rise
to the arrest is a minor, non-violent crime, and even when there is
no reason to believe that weapons, contraband, or other evidence of
a crime will be found.339 Many would consider strip searches a
greater invasion of privacy than a blood draw.
The “slippery slope” argument is that allowing this invasive
procedure without a warrant will inevitably lead to even more
invasive and warrantless procedures. That fear is misplaced. A blood
draw may be an invasive procedure, but it is only marginally so.
Newborns, arguably the most vulnerable of our species, undergo the
procedure in their first hours of life. Blood tests have become such a
routine procedure that many citizens undergo blood draws yearly
during their adult years. It seems incongruous to worry about the
“insult” of a blood draw to an impaired driver when that impaired
driver may cause serious injury, permanent disability, or even death
to an innocent traveler on the highway. The U.S. Supreme Court
should reconsider its rulings in McNeely and Birchfield.
B. Did the High Court Err by Rejecting Criminal Penalties
for Refusal?
The McNeely majority asserted that implied consent laws provide
drivers with strong incentives under civil law to submit to testing.340
But these incentives are really not very strong. If a driver knows he
is impaired, he is unlikely to risk the more severe criminal penalty
resulting from a conviction that the blood tests will assure. Under
those circumstances, a simple license suspension is the more at-
tractive option.
Criminal penalties for refusal of such tests have been adopted in
Great Britain, Canada,341 Austria, and the Northern Territory of
Australia.342 Often times, those penalties are as severe as those for
drunk driving. In those situations, there is less incentive for an
impaired driver to refuse the test. Given the extraordinary potential
for harm posed by drunk drivers, the punitive nature of such laws
seems trivial by comparison. The High Court’s concern that such
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biological evidence could be used by law enforcement authorities for
purposes unrelated to the crime could be addressed by laws requir-
ing disposal of the evidence upon exhaustion of appeals.
These laws may well be challenged by defendants who will assert
that their due process or perhaps Fourth Amendment rights have
been violated by the imposition of a criminal penalty for asserting
their right to privacy.343 But that’s no reason to hesitate. Defendants
will always find a way to challenge new laws. But these fortified
implied consent laws are supported by the fact that some penalties,
albeit civil, are already in place, and by the fact that other democratic
countries have successfully deployed them in their efforts to stem
drunk driving.344
C. What’s a State to Do?
Because reconsideration of these issues is unlikely, states should
consider alternative means to address the serious problems posed
by drunk drivers. State courts and state and local law enforcement
officers are closer to the problem of drunk driving. Most drunk driv-
ing crimes are prosecuted in state courts, not federal courts. It is
interesting to note that neither Schmerber, nor McNeely, nor the
Birchfield cases involved a vehicular fatality. Even in Schmerber, the
injuries appeared to be relatively minor. In none of the cases was
the U.S. Supreme Court dealing with tragedy. But faced with seri-
ously injured or permanently disabled victims and those suffering
from the senseless death of a loved one, it is understandable that
state courts feel a greater imperative to address the problem.
New technologies permit diabetics to test blood sugar levels with
only a drop of blood. Even more promising is the potential ability to
perform multiple laboratory tests using only one drop of blood.345
Perhaps such technologies could be used to test blood alcohol
levels. Arrestees themselves could conduct the procedure to provide
a single droplet of blood. This might still be considered to be an
“invasive procedure” but it is significantly less so than a formal blood
draw.
Further advances permit a diabetic to monitor blood glucose levels
343
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throughout the day by means of a “continuous glucose monitor.”346
This device uses a skin patch to detect glucose. Currently, the moni-
tor must be supplemented by daily finger pricks to calibrate the
patch. But it’s only a matter of time before blood glucose monitoring
will be accomplished non-invasively. Can blood alcohol monitoring
by means of a skin patch be far behind? States should track the
progress of these new scientific advancements and be ready to
incorporate them into their drunk driving investigations when
practicable. Defendants will challenge any warrantless search, even
pinpricks to extract blood. But it will be interesting to see how the
High Court balances this remarkably benign procedure against the
extraordinary harm that drunk drivers can and do cause.
IX. Conclusion
The U.S. Supreme Court should accord deference to state courts
whenever reasonable. Eleven states considered a “per se” rule a
necessary tool to address the deadly problems caused by drunk
drivers. It is those courts and those law enforcement officers, wit-
nesses, and victims who appear before them and who see first-hand
the devastation an impaired driver can cause.
Defendants subjected to warrantless blood draws are not without
legal recourse. Probable cause is probable cause. While searches
supported by judicial approval are preferred, the same recourse is
available to the defendant should that proof be found lacking. War-
rantless blood draws can be challenged on the basis of a lack of
probable cause whether a warrant was secured or not. A trial judge
will exclude from evidence blood test results that were secured as a
result of a blood draw unsupported by sufficient proof.
It should not be considered a serious invasion of Fourth Amend-
ment privacy interests to require a driver who exhibits signs of impair-
ment sufficient to establish probable cause to believe there are
drugs or alcohol in his blood to submit to a warrantless blood draw.
This is strongly supported by the fact that such minor medical
procedures, when performed by qualified medical personnel, are so
commonplace and considered so safe that they are performed on
infants not even an hour old.
In addition, courts should facilitate the prosecution’s efforts to
obtain the best, most reliable, evidence of the crime, especially in
circumstances where a driver’s impairment can lead to loss of life.
That evidence, secured as closely in time to the moment the ar-
restee was driving, can determine the truth of the matter and in
some instances may exonerate the arrestee.
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State courts should consider using the new medical technologies
on the horizon to determine blood alcohol content. In the end, the
accurate determination of impairment is in everyone’s best interests.
The person injured or killed by a drunk driver may very well be the
driver himself.
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